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THESIS
--===== 
ERN PmSES OF THE" ROriE"" mmsT 
PERPETUITIES AID RESmntTS UPON 
,1PPLI TO TID 
STATE OF OALIFoRNIA. 
THE SIS 
~====== 
MODERN PHASES OF THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES AND RESTRAINTS UPON ALIENATION 
APPLIED TO EtiTRUSTED PROPERTIES 
IN THE STATE OF CALIFOFk~IA 
There is perhaps no legal subject more interesting nor 
important in the sphere of trust activity than the so-called "Rule 
against Perpetuities". This rule is colorful in its historical 
antecedents, and in its present form, as part and parcel of the 
common law, is the creature of necessity evolved to prevent pro­
perty owners from placing their property perpetually beyond the 
reach of their descendants, or other beneficiaries. The doctrine 
compromises the conflict between those on the one hand who have 
amassed property, and who ftesire that the succeeding generations 
might enjoy the use and benefit thereof without possibility of the 
corpus being squandered or otherwise impaired, and those, on the 
other hand, who recognize the need of a rule embodying the principle 
of public policy, that the first purpose of property is its complete 
and unrestricted enjoyment, and that under no circumstance should it 
be dedicated to or diverted toward a purpose foreign thereto. 
To better underst&~d the subject of perpetuities and the 
rule governing the same, we might refer to Chief Baron Gilbert's 
definition -- "A perpetuity is the settlement of an interest descend-
able from heir to heir, so that it should not be in the power of him
--'­
in whom it i s vested, to dispose of it or turn it out of the channel". 
Lord Nottingham, in the Duke of Norfolk's case, the case recognized 
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by Mr. Gray, an authority on the subject of perpetuities, as laying 
the foundation for the modern rule against perpetuities, said: !fA 
perpetuity is the settlement of ~~ estate or interest in tail with 
such remainders expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power 
of the tenant in tail in possession, to dock by recovery or assign­
ment, but such remainders must continue as perpetual clogs upon the 
estate". 
Blackstone in Book II, in discussing the merits of per­
petuities sets out that ncova~ts of justice will not indulge even 
wills so as to create a perpetuity, which the law abhors: because 
by perpetuities (or the settlement of an interest, which shall go 
in the succession prescribed, without any power of alienation) 
estates are made incapable of answering those ends, of social commerce, 
and providing for the sudden contingencies of private life, for which 
property was at first establishedH • 
The rule against perpetuities has been gradually established 
by judicial deCisions, and affords a most notable instance of the 
nice adaptation of the principles of the common law to the decision 
of a question which requires at once a due regard for the rights of 
persons and property, and a careful consideration of these larger 
problems of public policy so essential to the welfare of co~munities 
and states, for public policy is opposed to the perpetual settlement 
of property in families in such manner that it is forever inalienable, 
or inalienable so long as there may be a person to take in answering 
the designation of some testator who died generations before. 
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Briefly summarizing the evil practices of the common 
law preceding and responsible for the rule against perpetuities, 
we find (1) the creation of indestructible estates tail, (2) the 
imposition of conditions against the alienation of present inter­
ests, and (3) the creation of estates that would not vest until 
some remote time, in futuro. These common law practices were 
respectively countered (1) by a rule making estates tail destruct­
ible, (2) by a rule against rest raints on alienation, making void, 
all unreasonable restraints or conditions against alienation of a 
present interest, and (3) by the rule against perpetuities sometimes 
referred to as the rule against remoteness, which voided all inter­
ests or estates which might vest beyond the prescribed period. All 
of these practices were motivated by the desire to continue exer­
cisL~g an influence on the affairs of the world after death, and all 
of the rules counteracting these practices were predicated upon the 
principl.e that property should be diverted to its proper channel 
without unreasonable delay. 
Without further reviewing the historical phases, we shall 
consider the rules against perpetuities and against restraints upon 
alienation insofar as they apply to present day trusts, both living 
and testamentary, created and administered in tr,is state. To 
simplify this treatise we shall consider a hypothetical case, in 
the light of the law, both legislative and judicial, of the State of 
California. 
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Let us assume a set of facts where the Trustor, a 
widower, creates a private or living trust by formal written 
Declaration of Trust by and with a corporate Trustee. 
The trus t provides that the Trustor might revoke the 
same during his lifetime, but that in the event of ~is death with­
out such revocation the corpus sr~ be divided among certain named 
beneficiaries, children and grandchildren of the Trustor, and among 
the issue of certain of the said beneficiaries, by right of repres­
entation, should said named beneficiaries be deceased or die before 
having attained majority. It further provides that should any of 
the said issue, taking by right of representation, not yet have 
attained the age of majority, then the trust shall continue as to 
such issue until such issue shall severally attain majority. The 
trust further provides,­
"In the event that any of the children of 
the said Trustor hereinbefore named as benefi­
ciaries hereunder, should predecease the said 
Trustor, then and in tr...at event, upon the death 
of the said Trustor, the said Trustee shall pay, 
transfer and convey the portion or portions of 
said trust estate to which such deceased child 
01:' deceased children would have been entitled 
had he, she or they been living at the time of 
the death of the said Trustor, equally, share 
and share alike, to the issue of such deceased 
clrlld or deceased children living at the time 
of the death of the said Trustor. 
"In the ·event that any of such surviving 
issue of any deceased child, or deceased chil­
dren of said Trustor, shall not have attained 
the age of majority at the time of the death 
of the s aid Trustor, then and in that event, 
the s aid Trustee shall continue to hold in the 
m~~ner and according to the terms and conditions 
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of this Declaration of T~Jst, the portion 
or portions of said trust estate to which 
such surviving issue under the age of majority 
are entitled, and as each of such surviving 
issue severally attains the age of majority, 
the said Trustee sha~l pay, transfer and con­
vey to him Ol~ to her, his or her proportionate 
share of said trust estate. 1f 
By the wording of the paragraphs just quoted, the Trustor 
obviously intends that the share or shares of issue of any deceased 
child of the Trustor should continue in trust until the respective 
majorities of such issue, irrespective of whether such issue be ~rn 
before or after the date of creation of the said trust. 
Is such a trt1St void under the laws of the State of 
California, by virtue of its provision that the share of certain 
i ssue, whether born before or after the date of execution of the 
living tYust, should continue in trust for such issue until major­
ity. In other words, can a Trustor validly create a living trust 
to endure beyond the lifetime of a person or persons in being, at 
the date of the creation of the trust? 
The solution of this problem involves the consideration 
of the following quotations on perpetuities and restraint upon 
alienation found in the Constitution and Civil Code of the State 
of California, viz: 
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The Constitution, Pxt. XX, Sec. IX, provides: 
"No perpetuities shall be allowed except 
for eleemosynary purposes ll • 
Pertinent sections from the Civil Code provide 
as follows:­
C. C. 715. 	Restraints upon F~ienation. 
"Except in the single case mentioned in 
Section Seven Hundred Seventy- Two, the absolute 
p017er of alienation cannot be suspended, by any 
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer 
period tb~n as follows: 
1. During the contL~uance of the lives of 
nersons in being at the creation of the limi­
tation or conditions; or 
2. For a period not to exceed twenty- five 
(25) years from the time of the creation of the 
suspension. II 
c. C. 772. 	 Contingent Remainder in Fee. 
IIA contingent remainder in fee may be created 
on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the 
event that the persons to whom the first remainder 
is limited, die under the age of twenty-one years, 
or upon any other contingency by which the estate 
of such persons may be determined before they 
attain majority." 
C. 	 C. 716. Future Interests void, which suspend 
Power of ft~ienation. 
IIEvery future interest is void in its 
creation which by any possibility may suspend 
the absolute power of alienation for a longer 
period thru1 is prescribed in this chapter. Such 
power of alienation is suspended when there are 
no persons in bell1g by whom an absolute interest 
in possession can be conveyed." 
C. C. 771. 	Suspension by Trust. 
liThe suspension of all power to alienate 
the subject of a trust other than a power to 
exchange it for other property to be held upon 
the same trust, or to sell it and reinvest the 
proceeds to be held upon the same trust, is a 
suspension of the power of alienation within 
the meaning of Section Seven Hundred and Fifteen.Tl 
C. 	 C. 749. Time of Creation, what . 
liThe delivery of the grant, where a limi­
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tation, condition or future interest is 
created by grant, @ld the death of the 
Testator, where it is created by will, is 
to be deemed the -time of the creation of the 
limitation, condition or interest within the 
meaning of this part of the code." 
TIME OF COM1ilENCEMENT OF SUSPENSION. 
That the time of commencement of the suspension of the 
power of alienation is the time of the execution of the Declaration 
of Trust, is clearly the meaning of C. C. 749, and is a conclusion 
supported by the decisions of the highest courts of this State. In 
the insta~t ' case there is a possibility of birth of issue to one or 
more of the children of the Trustor, which_children might in turn 
predecease the Trustor, in which event the trust would be continued 
until the majority of beneficiaries not in being at the date of 
execution of the Declaration of Trust. 
As to the time of commencement of the suspension of the 
power of alienation in a living or private trust, the Estate of 
Willey, 128 Cal. 1, is authority for the rule that the deed of trust 
vests the fee in the Trustee, subject only to the declared trusts 
and the execution thereof, and that the deed of trust declaring the 
trust in favor of the grantor for life, and reserving to him the 
power of revocation and modification of its provisions, and a direc­
tion to sell and convey any part of the pl'operty, and providing that 
·after his death the residue and remainder of the property should be 
held in trust to receive the income ill1d distribute it to certain 
named beneficiaries, leaves only the equivalent of a life estate in 
the grantor and not a fee simple. 
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At page 9 of the last mentioned case 
the Court says: liThe deed vested the fee 
in the Trustees subject only to the declared 
trust. The reserved right to revoke was a 
mere privilege and as it was never exercised 
it had no effect upon the estate gronted. 
'Except as hereinafter provided, every ex-press 
trust in real property, v8~id as such in its 
creation, vests the whole estate in the 
Trustees, subject only to the execution of 
the trust'. (C.C. 865.) 
"Section 2280 expressly provides that 
a trust mcLy be revoked if the Declaration 
of Trust reserves the power of revocation, 
and to hold that the power of revocation pre­
vents the vesting of an estate in the Trustee, 
would be to throw statutory provisions on the 
subject into utter confusion. There was at 
farthest nothing more left in_~he grfultor than 
the equivalent of a life estate.1t 
In the case of Tenant vs. John Tennant Memorial Home" 
167 Cal. 570, in considering the effect upon the conveyance where 
the deed reserves unto the grantee the right to revoke, the Court 
held: 
"The effect of the reservation of the life 
estate is that the deed conveys a future inter­
est, only, to the grantee. In respect to the 
time of enjoyment, an interest in realty is 
either present or future (C.C. 688.). A future 
interest entitles the owner to the possession 
of the property only at a future period (C.C. 
690.). A future interest is a vested interest 
when there is a person in being who will have 
a right, defeasible or indefeasible, to the 
immediate possession of the property when the 
intermediate estate or interest ceases (C.C. 
694.). This deed therefore purports to pass to 
the grantee at once a vested future interest in 
the land, said interest being the entire fee, 
following the termination of the reserved life 
estate." 
Continuing further, the Court holds: 
flSO, also, the fact that in this case there 
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" . 
is also reserved a power to revoke the deed 
and to sell the remainder, is of no consequence 
in the argument upon the question whether it 
is or is not testamentary. The power of 
revocation being valid, its exercise would at 
once revest the title in the grantor and she 
Vlould then have absolute power to dispose of 
it by deed or otherwise. The power of sale 
reserved is therefore of no consequence, since 
it was necessarily included in the power to 
revoke. rne reservation of the power to revoke 
did not operate to destroy, or in anYwise 
restrict the effect of the deed as a ~resent 
conveyance of a future vested interest. It 
merely afforded the means whereby such vested 
future estate could be defeated and divested _ 
before it ripened into an estate in possession. 
(See Nichols vs. Emery 109 Cal. 323.)." 
PEF..IOD OF SUSPENSION .ALLOWED BY LAW. 
In the instant case Section 715 of the Civil Code is 
applicable only as to subdivision 1, measuring the duration of the 
period of suspension by lIlives of persons in being". In dismissing 
subdivision 2, however, which was added to the said section in 1917, 
and which purports to permit a suspension for a definite period not 
to exceed t wenty-five (25) years from the time of the creation of 
the suspension, a passing reference should be made to Est ate of 
McCray, decided by the District COl~t of Appeal of California on 
October 25, 1927, and reported in 54 Cal. App . Dec. 625 and 160 
Pac. 940. This case held as unconstitutional the 1917 amendment 
on the ground that our Constitution incorporated the co~~on law 
"Rule against Perpetuities" limiting the duration of trusts to the 
length of IIlives in being", and that a trust for a fixed term of 
years might exceed the said COTI'JIlon law limit of duration. Although 
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the District Court of Appeal on November 25, 1927, denied a 
rehearing of this case, a petition for rehearing was granted 
by the Supreme Court of C8~ifornia on December 22, 1927, and 
the final decision thereon is awaited with intereste 
In interpreting subdivision 1 of Section 715 of the 
Civil Code, the decisions in this State are unanimous, with the 
possible exception of Goldtree vs. Thompson (79 Cal. 613), which 
may be distinguished, in holding void any trusts which by any 
possibility may suspend the absolute power of alienation for a 
period longer than that of ~ives in being at the date of the 
creation of the trust. 
In Berry vs. Lebus, 56 Cal. App. 578, the Court con­
siders the validity of a trust deed .wherein the Trustor has 
provided that upon his death, certain property should go to 
certain designated beneficiaries, and in the event of the death 
of one of the said beneficiaries, then to such beneficiary's 
issue as they respectively attain the ages of twenty-five, thirty 
and thirty-five years. The trust deed was attacked as void on the 
ground that it might possibly extend beyond lives in being at the 
date of its creation, inasmuch as the said issue of a beneficiary 
predeceasing the Trustor might be born after the date of the 
creation of the trust. 
The court in sustaining the trust justifies its pos­
ition by quoting a saving naragra£h in the trust deed, reading as 
follows, to-wit: 
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"It is distinctly understood that it 
is not the intent hereof to create a trust 
extending beyond lives in being; therefore, 
in any event, upon the death of the last 
survivor of persons herein mentioned now in 
being, this trust shall cease and determine 
and distribution of the principal of the 
entire net trust estate then held hereunder 
shall thereupon be made by said Trtlstee to 
the persons or person then entitled thereto 
under the terms hereof." 
In the Estate of wnitney reported in 176 Cal. 12, at 
page 15, considering the validity of a testamentary trust whereby 
the testator divided his estate in trust among his three children, 
each to truce his share upon arriving at the age of thirty-five 
years, and providing further that shou~d one of the sons die before 
the said age, the share of such deceased son was to continue in 
trust until the youngest child of such deceased son should become 
of age, the Court in discussing the period during which the power 
of alienation may be suspended, declares as follows: 
liThe time of the death of the testator 
is deemed to be the time of the 'creation of 
the limitation, condition, or future interest' 
declared to be void by the code sections above 
mentioned (C.C. 749). Section 716 declares 
that 'every future interest is void in its 
creation which, by any possibility', may sus­
pend the power of alienation longer than the 
code permits. This possibility is to be 
determined by the conditions existing 'at the 
time of the creation' of the limitation or 
future interests, - that is, at the time of 
the death of the testator. 'The statute does 
not permit us to wait and see whether events 
may not so transpire that in fact no perpetuity 
results, but if under the terms of the deed or 
will creating the trust, when properly construed, 
the instrument Iby any possibility may suspend' 
the absolute power of alienation beyond the con­
tinuance of lives in being, the instrument, 
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whether a deed or will, is void, and no 
trust is created nor any estate vested in 
the trustees.' (Est. Steele 124 Cal. 537; 
Gray on Perpetuities, Sec. 231)"; 
}£ter a further discussion of the case, the Court con­
tinuing at page 18, states: 
"If the effect of these provlslons in 
the possible event that a child shall die 
leaving a minor child or children, is that 
the title to the share is to be held by the 
trustees thereafter until the youngest child 
is of age and shall at that time, and not 
before, become vested in those of the issue 
that may then be living and the children, if 
any, of any deceased child, then it would con­
stitute a gift to a class of persons, not in 
being at the death of the testator, and neither 
the number of the class nor the persons who are 
to compose the class could be known or ascer­
tained until the youngest surviving child became 
of age. (See 1357 C.C.) Such remainder would be 
a future contingent interest which could not be 
aliened until the child became of age. (C.C. 
693-695) Then, for the first time, the persons 
who are to o~~ it would become known. That 
event must occur after the termination of the 
life of the child of the testator. From the 
death of such cluld. until the ~oungest of such 
issue became of age the ~ow~r of aliepation 
would be suspended, contrary to Section 715, 
aforesaid. (Est. of Cavarly 119 Cal. 409.) 
Under Section 716, such limitation would be void 
in its creation." 
In the Estate of Lux. 149 Cal. 200, the testator created 
a testamentary trust to continue "during the life of my son, Charles 
H. Lux, and of all of his children who are living at the time of my 
(the testatorIs) death. With the death of the survivor of them the 
said trust is to terminate tl • The Court in sustaining the validity 
of the will as against the objection that the ultimate beneficiaries 
might not be in being at the time of the creation of the trust, at 
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page 205, decides: 
liThe devise to the Trustees became 
effectual only at the death of the deceased. 
The limitation or condition which had the 
effect of suspending the absolute power of 
alienation was created when the devise 
became effectual. Under the provisions of 
the will, the trust cannot continue beyond 
the contL~uance of lives of persons in being 
at that time. n 
In the Estate of Cavarly, 1I9 Cal. 406, decided in 1897, 
and before the amendment of 715 C. C. permitting the suspension of 
the power of alienation for a twenty-five year period, the Court 
has under consideration a testa~entary trust whose terms provide 
that it shall continue "until my said younger son, Frank Bolles 
Cavarly, shall, or would if living. reach the age of thirty zears". 
The Court declf:.res such trust to be void as suspending 
the power of alienation for a time certain and not dependent upon 
any life or lives in being. The proponents of the document argued 
that if the postponement were too remote the postponement would be 
void as against public policy and as repugnant to the estate granted, 
and that the postponement being void, the estate would vest in 
possession within the period allowed, citing Saunders vs. Vautier, 
4 Beav. 1I5; Gray on Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 105; Gray on 
Perpetuities, Sec. 12Q; and 1 Jarman on Wills 292. 
The Court in answering this argument at page 409, states: 
nWe are not disposed to dispute these pro­
positions laid down by the learned counsel of 
the appellant. Our statute i p not, properly 
speaking. against oerpetuities. It simply pro­
hibits restraints upon alienatiQll. The 
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declaration that a future estate is void 
in its creation, which thus suspends the 
power of alienation, is to the same end. 
It is void if by any possibility it may 
suspend the absolute power of alienation 
beyond the prescribed period. Upon this 
point Chaplin, in his work on Suspension 
of Alienation, Section 1, remarks - speaking 
of the New York statute, from which ours was 
copied - that it affects all estates of every 
character wInch are capable of interfering 
with the power of alienation, and, secondly, 
that it does not insist upon the vesting of 
estates, but only their alienability. The 
doctrine of remoteness, therefore, has no 
materiality, except as it affects aliena­
bility. n 
In Toland vs. Toland 123 Cal. 140, in considering a will 
which provided for the sale of lands lias soon as the leases of 
rented lands are cancelled", the Court met contestant's objection 
that such suspension violated Sections 715 and 716 of the Civil 
Code, by stating that the tenants could at any time cancel their 
leases by agreement with the Executor to unite with him in the 
conveyance of the fee and possession of the land. At page 143 we 
find: 
"The statute does not prohibit all limi­
tations of estates by which the power of 
alienation is suspended, but permits a sus­
pension of such power with the restriction 
that the suspension shall not continue beyond 
the period of lives in being at the creation 
of the limitation, and in Section 716 defines 
this restriction as follows: 'Such power of 
alienation is suspended when there are no 
persons in being by whom an absolute interest 
in possession can be conveyed'. Consequently, 
whenever there are persons in being by whom an 
absolute interest in possession in the land 
can be conveyed, the power of alienation is 
-14­
not suspended. 1I 
In the Estate of' Steele 124 Cal. 5]£, there is before 
the Court a testamentary trust to continue during the lifetime 
of the widow of the testator, and to terminate as to three named 
minor cbildren when they respectively attain the age of twenty-
five years. Contestants argued that sL~ce no provision was made 
for the remainder over, in the event of the death of all of the 
said children under the age of twenty-five years, the trust must 
continue for a definite time, to-wit, until the youngest child 
would have attained the age of twenty-five years, and was there­
fore void. 
The Court in sustaining the v8~idity of the document 
calls attention at page 540, to the distinction between trusts 
void at the time of their creation and resulting trusts arislllg 
from failure of beneficiaries. 
!fA distinction should be taken between 
trusts which fail for want of beneficiaries, 
and trusts attempted to be created by will, 
but which are void under the statute against 
perpetuities, or other statutes, and there­
fore vest no estate in the alleged trustee; 
while if the trust is valid when created, and 
afterward fails for the want of a beneficiary, 
a trust results in favor of the heirs of the 
testator; but as the heirs and trustee may at 
any time convey ~~ absolute estate, the re­
sulting trust is not within the statute agaL~st 
perpetuities. tI 
The Estate of Van Wyck 185 Cal. 4~, is particularly in 
point in considering the instant case. Henry Van Wyck created a 
testamentary trust to endure during the lifetimes of his son and 
daughter, and provided that upon the death of the survivor of them, 
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IItheir or its descendants shall take the corpus" of the estate, 
provided, however, that the property shoLud continue in trust 
l1until the youngest grandchild shall become twenty-one years of 
age, and then to divide among and deliver absolutely to my grand­
children then surviving, and the lawful issue of any deceased 
grandchild by right of representation, all of my (testator's) 
estate then remaining iXl the hands of my trustee ll • The Court 
held that a trust created by a will which provides that it shall 
continue until the yotk~gest grandchild of the testator shall have 
become of the age of twenty-one years, is void as suspending the 
power of alienation for a longer period than that of the life of a 
person or persons in being at the time of the testator's death, 
since the yotk~gest grandchild would include a grandchild born after 
such death. 
In demonstrating the possibility of this trust extending 
beyond lives in being, the Court argues that since it is possible 
that a great-grandson might be born after the death of the testator's 
son and daughter, it is evident that upon their deaths, all persons 
necessary for the complete alienation may not be in being and the 
power of alienation will still be suspended; and continuing at page 
59,-
IIIt follows that if, after the death of 
the testator's son and daughter but before the 
youngest grandchild had reached twenty-one, all 
of the beneficiaries under the will should unite 
in an alienation, the alienation would not be 
complete, since there would still be outstanding 
the possible interest of any crdld born there­
after to a grandchild then living and joining in 
the alienation but who should die before the 
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arrival of the time provided by the will for 
division. Under the will then, it is possible 
that, UPOll the death of the testator's son and 
daughter, the trust must continue with the 
power of alienation suspended 14~til the youngest 
grandchild reaches twenty-one, since it may not 
be possible to determine sooner who is entitled 
to receive the corpus of the estate; that such, 
in fact, will be the situation if more than one 
grandchild survives the son and daughter. ~ 
possible period, therefore, during which the 
power of' alienation may be suspended.extends to 
the time when the xoungest grandchild reaches 
twenty-one, and since such grandchild may be one 
born after the death of the testator, such period 
is other than one for the lives of persons in 
being at the time of the creation of the trust, 
ru1d the trust comes within the prohibition of the 
statute." 
In answer to proponent's argument that the will created 
a case of alternative limitations, where if one be bad and the 
other valid, the invalidity of one would not affect the other, at 
page 61, the Court replies that 
"There is but one limitation, namely, that 
the trust shall remain intact with a consequent 
suspension of the power of alienation until the 
youngest grandchild reaches twenty-one. This 
event mayor may not happen within the lives of 
persons in being at the testator's death, and 
therefore the period fixed is a period not 
measured by the lives of such persons and is not 
permitted by the statute.1! 
One of the most recent devisions on the subject under 
consideration is the Estate of Maltman, reported in 195 Cal. 643. 
Mr. Maltman attempted a testamentary tr~st by will, providing that 
one-half of his estate should be held in trust during the lifetimes 
of his daughter, Teresa, her husband and their daughter, and the 
other half to be held in trust durL~g the lifetimes of his son John, 
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John's wife and their children !tso long as they or either of 
them sh....all live ll , and when "his (John I s) wife and all of his 
children shall have died said trust shall cease and terminate". 
After quoting Sections 715 and 716 of our Civil Code, 
the Court continues at page 649, as follows: 
lilt is not necessary to again indulge in an 
elaborate review of the history or proper inter­
prepation of these two sections of the Civil 
Code. That was done at much length and with 
great learning in the leading case of Estate of 
Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, from the reasoning of 
which there has been no material departure since 
its decision thirty years ago. Two particular 
clauses found in these sections of the Civil Code 
have been given more exact definitions in later 
cases. One of these is the clause found in both 
of these sections referring to the 'creation' of 
the limitation, condition, estate or interest 
affected by the inhibition of these code pro­
visions. 
"In Estate of 'Whitney, 176 Cal. 12, it was 
held that the time of the death of the testator 
whose will contained provisions for the creation 
of such condition, limitation, estate or interest 
was the date fixed by these code sections for the 
purpose of determining their validity (C.C. 749.). 
The court in that case quoted approvingly from 
Estate of Steele, 124 Ce~. 555. The language of 
the Court in that case to the effect that 'The 
statute does not permit us to wait and see whether 
events may not so transpire that in fact no per­
petuity results, but if under the terms of the 
deed or will creating the trust, when properly 
construed, the instrument "by any possibility max 
suspend" the absolute power of alienation beyond 
the continuance of lives in being, the instrument, 
whether a deed or wiLl, is void, and no trust is 
created nor any estate vested in the trustee'." 
The leading case in this State on the present subject 
is in reo Walkerly. 108 Cal. 627. The Court in an ey~austive 
and well reasoned opinion sets out the law concerning the suspension 
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of the power of alienation. This case was decided in 1895 
and before the amendment of Section 715 C. C., permitting 
trusts to continue for a definite period of time. The reason­
ing, however, of this case and the law therein set out, are 
none the less relevant and applicable to the instant case. The 
testamentar,r trust attempted, provided that the property of the 
decedent should remain in trust for a period of twenty-five 
years, or should his wife be then still living, it should con­
tinue in trust during her lifetime. 
The Court in applying the restrictions upon alienation 
to trusts as well as other conveyances, after citing Civil Code 
Sections 715, 716, 771 a.11Q. 749, exhaustively reviews the law on 
this subject, declaring at page 647 et seq: 
UA perpetuity is any limitation or 
condition which may (not which will or must) 
take away or suspend the absolute power of 
alienation for a period beyond the contin­
uance of lives in being. The absolute power 
of alienation is equivalent to the power of 
conveying an absolute fee (Chaplin on Sus­
pension of Alienation, Section 64). The law 
against the suspension of the power of alien­
ation applies to every kind of conveyance and 
devise. It applies to a~l trusts whether 
created by ¥I-ill or deed, whether providing 
for remainders or executory devises, or, as 
here, merely restraining the power of alien­
ation for a fixed period of years, and then 
provising for s8~e with gift over. In short, 
it 'covers the entire field of estates, 
interests, rights and possibilities' (Chaplin 
Suspension of Alienation, Section 2.). Says 
Perry: fA perpetuity will no more be tolerated 
when it is covered by a trust than when it 
displays itself undisguised in the settlement 
of a legal estate' (Perry on Trusts, Section 
382), 8..'1d Section 771 of the Civil Code is but 
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an enactment of this rule. 
JrEvery express trust, valid in its 
creation, vests the whole estate in the 
trustees. The beneficiaries t ake no estate 
or interest in the property, but may enforce 
the performance of the trust. (C. C. 863.) 
If this trust be not valid in its creation, 
the trustees would take no estate, but neither 
would the beneficiaries, whose rights are de­
pendent upon the validity of the trust. ~-lPk 
The beneficiaries herein then take no estate 
as such, their interest being the right to the 
enforcement of the trust. 
I~ut, if we understand the position of 
respondents, it is contended that the nephews 
~~d nieces take a future estate, which future 
estate is vested and is alienable, and that 
therefore it is a valid estate, since only those 
future interests are void which by possibility 
may unduly suspend the power of alienation. 
Following this argument and for this purpose 
treating the interests of the beneficiaries as 
a future interest or estate withL~ the contem­
plating of the code (C.C. 716.), it may be first 
suggested that all expectant estates, whether 
vested in interest or contingent with a vested 
right, or entirely contingent, pass by succession, 
will and transfer, like present estates and 
interests. (C.C. 699.) But the fact that such 
interests may pass does not relieve from the 
operation of the rule unless there are persons 
in being who, by combining and conveying all 
their distinct interests created by the original 
grant or deVise, can pass an absolute interest 
in possession. Conceding that the future inter­
est of the beneficiaries is vested in the sense 
in which remainders are spoken of as vesting, and 
that the interest would thus be alienable, it 
still is not such an interest as would by transfer 
carry an absolute interest in possession. As is 
pointed out by the Court in Vanderpoel vs. Loew, 
112 N.Y. 167, the vesting of an estate involves 
absolute alienability only so far as that partic­
ular estate is concerned. The fact that a give~ 
remainder is vested renders it absolutely 
alienable, so far as it i s itself concerned, but 
the absolute fee may at the same ti~e be inalien­
able. Therefore, to convey this absolute interest 
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in possession the beneficiaries would· be 
compelled to unite with their conveyance 
that of the trustees in whom the fee is 
vested. But the trustees cannot convey 
until the ~iration of twenty-five years. 
An attempt by them to convey before that 
time would contravene the trust. and be a 
void act (C.C. 870), and so even by this 
method of progression our path leads to 
that barrier of perpetuity which cannot be 
surmounted. 
nso, even though the beneficiary should 
be a remainder man under such a trust as this, 
he still could not alienate the land within 
the trust period so as to avoid the statute. 
Such a trust cannot be terminated or destroyed 
during the period fixed for the existence, even 
by the consent ruld joint act of all the trustees 
and beneficiaries. (Douglas vs. Cruger, 80 N.Y. 
15, Penfield vs. Tower 1 N.D. 216.) 
"Hence the question whether the interest of 
the beneficiaries is contingent or vested is here 
of no possible moment. The absolute ali§nability 
required by Section 715 of the Civil Code does not 
imply vesting, and it affords no escape from the 
operation of the rule, because the interests which 
the beneficiaries take may be relieved from un­
certainty as to persons or events. V~'hen so 
relieved the interest may be said to be vested. 
But it is not such a vesting nor yet such an 
interest as removes the bar of the statute, since 
all of the interests and estates, contingent and 
vested, cannot convey the fee so long as the terms 
of the trust, from which alone their interests are 
derived stand in the way. The Derpetuity here does 
not result from too remote limitations or the fail­
ure of future estates to vest, but it arises by 
the direct act of the testator in forbidding his 
trustees to alienate for a period not tolerated by 
:t.he law. It 
TRUSTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
Answering the contention sometL~es advanced that the 
restrictions on the suspension of alienation apply only to real 
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property, in re Walkerly (supra) may again be cited, this 
time as authority for the proposition that trusts in personal 
property come within 715 C.C. At page 656 et seq. we read as 
follows: 
liThe essential difference in this state 
between trusts in real property known as 
express trusts, and those in personal property 
are: 1. The former can only be of the kinds 
permitted by the statute, and no others (Civ. 
Code, sec. 857), while the latter may be 
created generally for any purpose for which a 
contract may be made (Civ. Code sec. 2220); 
2. The former must be created and declared by 
1J'rriting (Civ. Code, sec. 852), while the latter 
may rest upon parol. (Civ. Code, sec. 2222.) 
But to all trusts, whether of real or personal 
property, the limitation upon the suspension of 
the power of alienation expressed in Section 715 
of the Civil Code directly applies. The Section 
is found in Division II, Part 1, Title II, of the 
Code where the lawmakers are dealing; as expressly 
declared, with the modifications of o~TIership and 
restraints upon alienation of 'property in general'. 
Again, Section 771 of the Civil Code shows plainly 
the applicability of the law to personal property. 
For if it be oP~Y the suspension of the power to 
alienate real property which is ~Ulder the ban, 
power to sell the rea~ty would relieve the diff­
iculty, and yet it is by that section e~~ressly 
declared that personal property held after sale 
under the terms of the original trust operates 
to suspend the power of alienation, ~mder Section 
715 of the Civil Code. And finally, the applica­
bility of Section 715 to trusts in personal 
property has often been recognized and never 
Sl,uestioned. (Estate of Hinckley, supra; Goldtree 
v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 615; Williams v. Williams, 
75 Cal. 99; wDitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192) 
tlWe are not unmindful of the fact that the 
statutes of the State of New York in express 
terms put a limitation upon the power to suspend 
the ownership of personal property. (1 N.Y. Rev. 
Stats., Sec. 775, Subd. 1.) And we r~ve not 
overlooked the circumstance tlw.t the Supreme 
Courts of Mic:bigan and Wisconsin have uniformly 
held that their statutes similar in terms to our 
-22­
Code provlSlons do not apply to trusts in 
personal property. But it is to be observed 
that the Legislature of this State, in adopt­
ing Section 715 of the Civil Code, pl aced it 
where it must apply, and, therefore, made it 
apply to ' property in general i, while the 
corresponding Section in the Michigan statutes 
(Howell's Annotated Statutes of Michigan, Sec. 
5551, Subd. 15), and that of the Wisconsin 
s tatutes (Wis. Rev. StQts. Sec. 2059), are 
found in the Chapters of the law relating to 
estates in real property, and so have been 
construed by the Court s to be applicable only 
to trusts in such property (Toms. v. Williams, 
41 Mich. 552; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wi s . 70; 
Palms v. P8~S, 68 Mich. 555; De Wolf v. Lawson, 
supra). 
"In those states it is held that, as to 
trusts in personal property, the common-law rule 
still obtains. And it is for the application 
of this rule that respondents here contend. But 
even this would not avail to save the trust. 
The common-law rule against perpetuities does 
not, as counsel argue, apply only to l anded 
estates. Executory devises, springing and shift­
i ng uses, and trust s whether of r ealty or person­
alty were all within its terms. (1 Jarman on 
Wills, C. 9; Lewis on Perpetuities, 159; Perry 
on Trusts, Secs. 377, 584; Lewin on Trusts, c. 7; 
Gray on Perpetuities, Sec. 202; 4 Kent' s Commen­
taries, 271; Cadellv. Palmer, 1 Clark &F. 372). 
As Jarman states: 'To the test of the rule 
settled by Cadell v. Pauner, supra, every gift 
of real or personal estate, by will or otherwi se , 
must be brought' (1 Jarman on Wills, 217)." 
"By the Thelluson Act (39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 
98) the may"imum ?eriod during which the power of 
alienation could be restrained was lives in being 
and t wenty-one years and nine months. Testated 
by that act still would this trust be invalid. 
"We hold , however, tha.t section 715 of the 
Civil Code not only applies to trusts in personal 
~~operty, but also that it shortens t he period 
permitted by the common law to lives in being. 
Private trusts in personal property whicll suspend 
the power of alienation must be limited like 
private trusts in realty to lives in being, and 
the trusts here (covering person8~ property) are 
consequently destroyed by the same vice which 
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invalidated those first considered 

(covering real property).11 

S~ARABILITY OF VOID M~D VALID PROVISIONS. 
As to whether or not the valid provisions of trusts 
and wills might be sustained while the invalid ones are disre­
garded as violative of the law, the following citations are 
offered. In Nellis vs. ~ickard 135 Cal. 617, sustaining the 
valid trusts on the theory that they are severable from the 
invalid ones, the Court quotes Gray in his Rule agains t Perpet­
uities, Section 341, at page 621, as follows: 
"When the settlor or testator has him­
self separated the contingencies, there is 
no difficulty in regarding the gifts 
separate~, and upholding one, although the 
other fails. And the Courts naturally, &~d 
properly, le&~ to construing the gifts 
separately, when it can be done." 
Remarking that the test should be the possibility of 
sustaining the valid clause without giving effect to the invalid 
clause, the Court contL~ues on page 621, et seq: 
"If the several trusts are not so inter­
dependent as that neither one can be dealt 
with without giving effect to the others, the 
. Court will sort out the good from the bad, 
and give effect to the valid trusts." 
In the Estate of Willey, (supra) at page 11, in dis­
cussing the separability of valid from void provisions, the Court 
says: 
"The principle which should govern 
courts in determining questions like the 
one now under review, whether they arise 
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out of wills or deeds, is expressed by the 
maxim - ut res magis valeat quam pereat; 
and, under the inspiration of that maxim, 
courts have firmly established the prin­
ciple that valid trusts shoD~d not be 
disregarded because in the instrument 
creating them one particular invalid trust 
is declared, unless the latter is so in­
separably blended with the others that it 
cannot be eliminated without destroying the 
main intent of the trustor, or working 
manifest injustice to other beneficiaries. 
Among the various authorities cited by 
appellant to this point, Darling vs. Rogers, 
22 Wend. 483, Vanschuyver vs. ~rulford, 59 
N.Y. 452, Kennedy vs. Hoy 105 N.Y. 154, and 
Kane vs. Gott, 24 Wend. 641, 55 Am. Dec. 641, 
may be mentioned as cases where the subject 
is fully discussed and the principle aptly 
stated." 
In the Estate of Whitney, 176 Cal. 12, in discussing 
the same subject and after quoting the above excerpt from the 
Estate of Willey (supra) the Court continues at page 19: 
"If the elimination of the void trust 
causes no important practical change in the 
testator' s general scheme, if such void trust 
is not essential thereto, and does not impair 
the validity of the other dispositions of the 
will, it may be cut off and the other disposi­
tions allowed to stand. (Manice vs. Manice, 
43 N.Y. 381.) If the trust created 'is of such 
a nature as to make it indivisible, and in­
capable of being carried out as to that trust 
which is clearly legal, because of the invalid­
ity of the other trust', the whole trust must 
be held void. (Nellis vs. Rickard 155 Cal. 
620.). "fhe question whet her the valid clauses 
can stand depends on whether or not the invalid 
ones are so interwoven with them that they cannot 
be elimli1ated without interfering with and chang­
ing the main scheme of the testator. In Darling 
vs. Rogers 22 Wend. (N.Y. ) 495, Senator Verplanck 
correctly stated the rule as follows: "When a 
will is good in part and bad in part, the part 
otherwise valid is void if it works such a dis­
tribution of the estate as, from the whole 
testament taken together, was evidently never 
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the design of the testator. Otherwise, 
when a good part is so far independent 
that it would have stood had the testator 
been aware of the invalidity of the rest".' 
(Estate of Fair 132 Cal. 540.)n 
In the Estate of Van Wyck 185 Cal. 49, in stating at 
page 61 that lithe question is one of separabilityll, the Court 
continues at page 62, et seq: 
"The real question presented where a 
will contains both valid and invalid pro­
visions is whether the two are so parts of 
a single plan or scheme or otherwise so 
dependent one upon the other that by avoid­
ing the invalid provisions and allowing the 
valid to stand there vall result a disposi­
tion of the estate so different from what 
the testator contemplated or so unreasonable 
that it must be presumed that the testator 
would not have made the valid provisions if 
he had been aware of the invalidity of the 
others. The rule in fact is frequently stated 
more strongly against allowing the valid pro­
visions to stand than we have just stated it.1I 
The Court follows with the citations of estate of Fair 
and Darling vs. Rogers, quoting the ?ortions as set forth in the 
Estate of Vf.hitney (supra); and continuing at page 65 the Court 
renders its decision as f ollows : 
"In other words, it appears that the 
valid and i..'1valid portions of the trust 
which the testator attempted to create are 
so intimately connected and so dependent one 
REan the other that the invalid portions 
cannot be taken away without the whole scheme 
and plan of the testator fa~ling. The trust 
must therefore be declared invalid in toto." 
In the Estate of Steele (supra) at page 537 the Court 
after referring to Section 716 of the Civil Code, Ilwhich declares 
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Ivoid in its creationI every future interest which 'by any 
possibility may suspend' et cetera", continues, 
HThe statute does not permit us to 
wait and see whether events may not so trans­
pire that in fact no perpetuity results, but 
if under the terms of the deed or will 
creating the trust, when properly construed, 
the instrument 'by any possibility ma.y sus­
pend' the absolute power of alienation beyond 
the continuance of lives in being, the instr£­
ment, whether a deed or will, i s void , and no 
trtlSt i s created nor any estate vested in the 
trustee. T1 
In the Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 525, involving a trust 
to convey before such trust was permitted by statute, at page 552, 
the Court declares: 
"Of course, if an estate be created sub­
ject to several trusts, one of wl-'..ich is void, 
and the latter is legQ.lly separable from the 
others, the estate vests, unaffected by the 
void trust; but i f the creation of the estate 
depends upon the execu.tion of t he void trust, 
then it can never come into existence. 1I 
.And at -)age 541 after citing an excerpt from Darling vs. 
Rogers as quoted (supra) in the Estate of Whitney, the Court 
-'-0con "lnues: 
"Jl.nd in the celebrated Tilden will case 
(Tilden vs. Greene, 150 N.Y. 50) the Courts 
say: 'The appellants invoke the aid of the 
principle that where several trusts are created 
by will which are independent of each other, 
and each complete in itself, some of which are 
lawful and others unlawful, and which may be 
separated from each other, the illegal trust 
may be cut off and the legal one permitted to 
st2~d. This rule i s of frequent application 
in the construction of wills, but it can only 
be applied in aid and assistance of the 
manifest intent of the test ator and never 
where it will lead to a result contrary to the 
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purposes OI the will, or work injustice 
among the beneIiciaries, or defeat the 
testator's scheme Ior the disposal of his 
proper ty. r -* ~:- -;:- * We hold that the in­
validity of the trust to convey destroys 
the whole schenie of the will, and carries 
with it the trust for the lives of the 
children. II 
At page 546 in answer to the argument that to destroy 
the trust would mean intestacy OI the testator as to that portion 
of the estate over which he attempted to create a trust, the 
Court quotes the Estate of Yo-ung, 123 Cal. 343, as follows: 
"One of these rules firmly established 
and never departed from nor even criticized, 
is, that the expressed intent will not be 
varied under the guise of correction because 
the testator misapprehended its legal effect. 
The testator is presumed to know the law. 
If the legal effect of his expressed intent is 
intestacy.2 it will be presumed that he designe;! 
that result. The inquiry will not go to the 
secret workings of the mind of the testator. 
It is not, ~nut did he mean? but it is, What 
do his words mean? n 
In the Estate of Maltman (supra) the Court leans upon 
the above quoted excerpts from the Estate of Van Wyck, Estate of 
Fair and Darling vs. Rogers, in holding that the valid and void 
provisions are nso far inseparable that the holding of the one 
portion thereof void as in violation of the statute against per­
petuities, invalidates the entire trust.1t 
In reo Walkerly (already quoted at some length on 
other points) the Court on pages 651 and 652 in declaring the 
trust void answers as follows proponents objection that the tes­
tatar's intention has been violated: 
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"So it happens that whenever a tes­
tator, through temerity or ignorance, 
violates the plain mandate of the statute, 
as in this case, and creates a trust by 
which the absolute power of alienation is 
sought to be suspended for a term of years, 
he must pay the penalty of his rashness or 
folly in the destruction of his cherished 
design. * ~l- -J~ ~- The intestacy of the tes­
tator as to the Walkerly block is the harsh 
result which must follow this void trust, and 
the property will descend to his heirs. It 
is true that such was not the testator's 
L~tent, but a testator must do more than 
merely evince an intention to disinherit 
before the heirs' right of succession can 
be cut off. He must make a valid disposition 
of his property. (Harberghan vs. Vincent, 
2 Ves. Jr. 204; Halley vs . James 16 Wend. 
150; Haynes vs. Sherman, 117 N.Y. 433)." 
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS. 
Summarizing the foregoing citations, we find that the 
constitutional and legislative enactments as interpreted by the 
judicial decisions of this State establish as law, (1) that the 
suspension of the power of alienation commences in a living trust 
at the time of its creation, even though the right to revoke be 
reserved by the Trustor; (2) that the limit of the duration of 
such suspension is the lifetime of a person or persons in being at 
the time of such commencement of suspension; (3) that the pro­
bibition against such suspension applies to personal property 
as well as real property; and (4) that where both valid and in­
valid provisions are contained in a trust, all constituting a 
single plan or scheme intimately connected and interwoven, the 
-29­
trust is void in its entirety. Applying these legal prin­
ciples to the instant case, we find that the attempted trust 
suspends the power of alienation for a period longer than lives 
in being at the date of the execution of the Declaration of 
Trust and, the Trustor's intentions to the contrary notwith­
standing, the purported tr~st is void in toto and ab initio, 
no estate has vested in the Trustee, and in the absence of some 
other conveyance or a testamentary disposition by the Trustor, 
he must be found to have died intestate as to the property com­
prising the "corpus" of this attempted invalid trust. 
Respectfully submitted to 
THE SCHOOL OF LAW, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY, 
. '­
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